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Stochastic Stackelberg games
Deepanshu Vasal
Abstract
In this paper, we consider a discrete-time stochastic Stackelberg game where there is a defender
(also called leader) who has to defend a target and an attacker (also called follower). Both attacker
and defender have conditionally independent private types, conditioned on action and previous state,
that evolve as controlled Markov processes. The objective is to compute the stochastic Stackelberg
equilibrium of the game where defender commits to a strategy. The attacker’s strategy is the best
response to the defender strategy and defender’s strategy is optimum given the attacker plays the best
response. In general, computing such equilibrium involves solving a fixed-point equation for the whole
game. In this paper, we present an algorithm that computes such strategies by solving smaller fixed-
point equations for each time t. This reduces the computational complexity of the problem from double
exponential in time to linear in time. Based on this algorithm, we compute stochastic Stackelberg
equilibrium of a security example.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, Stackelberg games have been used extensively in the security of real world
systems such as to protect ports, airports and wildlife [2], [3], [8], [11]. A Bayesian Stackelberg
game is played between two players: a defender and an attacker. The attacker has a private
type that only she observes, however, the defender knows the prior on that state. The defender
commits to a strategy that is observable to the attacker. The attacker then plays a best response
to attacker’s strategy to maximize its utility. Knowing that the attacker will play a best response,
the defender commits to and plays a strategy that maximizes its utility. Such pair of strategies is
called a Stackelberg equilibrium. It is known that such strategies can provide higher utility to the
defender than obtained in a Nash equilibrium of the game. Such games have been used in the
real world by security agencies such as the US Coast Guard, the Federal Air Marshals Service,
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Texas, Austin (dvasal@utexas.edu,
https://sites.google.com/view/dvasal/home).
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2and the Los Angeles Airport Police [12]. Similar algorithms are used in wildlife protection in
Uganda and Malaysia [16].
Most of the above real world applications of Stackelberg equilibrium are based on single-
shot Bayesian game models. However, in many practical scenarios, the attacker and defender
interact periodically, thus reducing the applicability of such models. Solving a dynamic stochastic
Stackelberg game when both the attacker and the defender have a private Markovian states is
computationally challenging. This is because unlike other games, in such dynamic games of
asymmetric information, there is coupling of players’ strategies across time. Since strategy of a
player is a map from each history of the game which grows exponentially with time, the space of
strategies of the players is double exponential in, rendering such problems intractable. Recently,
there has been results on sequential decomposition of certain classes of games of asymmetric
information [13]–[15]. In repeated Stackelberg security games, there have been other approaches
to mitigate this issue. For instance Kar et al in [7] consider a repeated Stackelberg game and use
a new human behavior model to study such games. Mareki et.al. in [9] study a Bayesian repeated
Stackelberg game where they assume defenders are myopic, thus significantly simplifying the
analysis of finding the equilibrium. Balcan et al in [1] consider a learning theoretic approach to
study a repeated Stackelberg game between attacker and defender where they use regret analysis
to learn attacker’s types, and show sub-linear regret for both complete and partial information
models.
In this paper, we provide a dynamic programming like sequential decomposition algorithm
for stochastic dynamic Stackelberg games to compute equilibria with fully rational attacker and
defender. Our algorithm consists of a backward recursive step which, for each time t, involves
solving a fixed-point equation for the attacker and an optimization problem for the defender. This
reduces the complexity of finding Markovian equilibria of such games from double exponential
to linear in time. Based on this algorithm, we study a security game where we numerically find
its Stackelberg equilibria.
The paper is structured as follows. We present our model in Section II. We discuss background
material and solution concept in Section III. In Section IV, we present our main result of
providing an algorithm to compute Markovian equilibrium strategies. In Section V, we discuss an
infinite horizon version of the problem. In Section VI, we discuss the complexity of the proposed
algorithm. In Section VII, we present a numerical example. We conclude in Section VII. All
proofs are presented in the Appendices.
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3A. Notation
We use uppercase letters for random variables and lowercase for their realizations. For any
variable, subscripts represent time indices and superscripts represent player indices. We use
notation At:t′ to represent the vector (At, At+1, . . .At′) when t′ ≥ t or an empty vector if t′ < t.
We remove superscripts or subscripts if we want to represent the whole vector, for example
At represents (A1t , . . . , A
N
t ). In a similar vein, for any collection of sets (X
i)i∈N , we denote
×i∈NX
i by X . For any finite set S, ∆(S) represents the space of probability measures on S
and |S| represents its cardinality. We denote by P g (or Eg) the probability measure generated
by (or expectation with respect to) strategy profile g. We denote the set of real numbers by
R. For a probabilistic strategy profile of players (σit)i∈N where the probability of action a
i
t
conditioned on a1:t−1, xi1:t is given by σ
i
t(a
i
t|a1:t−1, x
i
1:t), we use the notation σ
−i
t (a
−i
t |a1:t−1, x
−i
1:t)
to represent
∏
j 6=i σ
j
t (a
j
t |a1:t−1, x
j
1:t). All equalities/inequalities involving random variables are to
be interpreted in the a.s. sense. For mappings with range function sets f : A → (B → C) we
use square brackets f [a] ∈ B → C to denote the image of a ∈ A through f and parentheses
f [a](b) ∈ C to denote the image of b ∈ B through f [a]. A controlled Markov process with state
Xt, action At, and horizon [T ] is denoted by (Xt, At)t∈[T ].
II. MODEL
We consider a stochastic Stackelberg game over a time horizon [T ]
△
=
{1, 2, . . . T} with perfect recall as follows. Suppose there are two kinds of players: a leader and
a follower. Both the leader and the follower have private types, xlt ∈ X
l, x
f
t ∈ X
f , respectively,
at time t, where xft , x
l
t evolve as a conditionally independent controlled Markov processes in the
following way,
P (xlt, x
f
t |a1:t−1, x1:t−1) = Q(x
l
t|at−1, xt−1)Q(x
f
t |at−1, xt−1), (1a)
where at = (alt, a
f
t ), xt = (x
l
t, x
f
t ) and Q are known kernels. Leader takes action a
l
t ∈ A
l at
time t on observing a1:t−1, xl1:t, and the follower takes action a
f
t ∈ A
f at time t on observing
a1:t−1 and x
f
1:t, where a1:t−1 is the common information among players, and x
l
1:t−1(x
f
t:t−1) is the
private information of the leader (and the follower, respectively). The sets Al,Af ,X l,X f are
assumed to be finite. Let σi = (σit)t∈[T ] be a probabilistic strategy of player i ∈ {l, f} where
σit : A
t−1×(X i)t → P(Ai) such that player i plays action Ait according to A
i
t ∼ σ
i
t(·|a1:t−1, x
i
1:t).
Let σ
△
= (σi)i∈{l,f} be a strategy profile of all players. At the end of interval t, the leader receives
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4an instantaneous reward Rlt(xt, at) and the follower receives an instantaneous reward R
f
t (xt, at).
Suppose players discount their rewards by a discount factor δ ≤ 1.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present some preliminaries.
A. Stackelberg Equilibrium
The Stackelberg equilibrium is defined for a game as follows. For a given strategy profile of
the leader, σl, the follower maximizes its total discounted expected utility over finite horizon T ,
max
σf
E
σl,σf
{
T∑
t=1
δt−1R
f
t (Xt, At)
}
. (2)
Let BRf (σl) be the set of optimizing strategies of the follower given a strategy σl of the leader,
i.e.
BRf (σl) = argmax
σf
E
σl,σf
{
T∑
t=1
δt−1Rlt(Xt, At)
}
(3)
The leader finds its optimal strategy that maximizes its total expected discounted reward given
that the follower will use its best response to it,
σ˜l ∈ max
σl
E
σl,BRf (σl)
{
T∑
t=1
δt−1Rlt(Xt, At)
}
, (4)
Then (σ˜l, σ˜f) constitute a Stackelberg equilibrium where σ˜f ∈ BRf(σ˜l).
B. Perfect Stackelberg equilibrium
In this paper, we will consider both players’ equilibrium policies that only depend on their
current states xlt, x
f
t and action history, i.e. at equilibrium, a
i
t ∼ σ˜
i
t(·|a1:t−1, x
i
t), i ∈ {l, f}.
1
For the game considered, we introduce a notion of Perfect Stackelberg Equilibrium (PSE),
inspired by perfect Bayesian equilibrium [6] as follows.
Let (σ˜, µ) be a PSE of the game, where µ = (µ
t
)t∈[T ], and for any t, a1:t−1, µt[a1:t−1] =
(µlt[a1:t−1], µ
f
t [a1:t−1]) ∈ P(X
l) × P(X f) is the equilibrium belief on the current state (xlt, x
f
t ),
given the action history a1:t−1, i.e. µit[a1:t−1](x
i
t) = P
σ˜(xit|a1:t−1), i ∈ {l, f}. Then for all t ∈ [T ],
1Note, however, that for the purpose of equilibrium, the optimization will be performed in the space of all possible strategies
that may depend on the entire history of state.
May 6, 2020 DRAFT
5h
f
t = a1:t−1, h
l
t = (a1:t−1, x
l
1:t), h
f
t = (a1:t−1, x
f
1:t), for any given σ
l, with some abuse of notation,
let BRf (σl) be defined as, ∀hft
BRf (σl) :=
⋂
t
⋂
h
f
t
argmax
σf
E
σl,σf
{
T∑
n=t
δn−tRfn(Xn, An)|h
f
t
}
(5)
and ∀hlt
σ˜l ∈
⋂
t
⋂
hlt
argmax
σl
E
σl,BRf (σl)
{
T∑
n=t
δn−tRfn(Xn, An)|h
l
t
}
, (6)
Then (σ˜l, σ˜f) constitute a PSE of the game where σ˜f ∈ BRft (σ˜
l) ∀ t ∈ [T ].
C. Common agent approach
We recall that the leader and the follower generate their actions at time t as follows, alt ∼
σlt(·|a1:t−1, x
l
1:t) and a
f
t ∼ σ
f
t (·|a1:t−1, x
f
1:t). An alternative way to view the problem is as follows.
As is done in the common information approach [10], at time t, a fictitious common agent
observes the common information a1:t−1 and generates prescription functions γt = (γlt, γ
f
t ) =
ψt[a1:t−1]. Player i uses its prescription function γit to operate on its private information to
produce its action ait, i.e. γ
i
t : (X
i)t → P(Ai) and ait ∼ γ
i
t(·|x
i
1:t). It is easy to see that for any
σ policy profile of the players, there exists an equivalent ψ profile of the common agent (and
vice versa) that generates the same control actions for every realization of the information of
the players.
Here, we will consider Markovian common agent’s policy as follows. We call a common
agent’s policy be of “type θ" if the common agent observes the common belief pit derived from
the common observation a1:t−1, and generates prescription functions γt = (γlt, γ
f
t ) = θt[pit],
where pit = (pi
l
t, pi
f
t ) and pi
i
t is a belief on the current state x
i
t defined as, pi
i
t(x
i
t) = P
θ(xit|a1:t−1)
for i ∈ {l, f}. The player i uses rescription function γit to operate on its current private type x
i
t
to produce its action ait, i.e. γ
i
t : X
i → P(Ai) and ait ∼ γ
i
t(·|x
i
t).
In the next lemma we show that for any given θ policy, the belief states piit can be updated
recursively as follows. Let pii1(x
i
1) := Q
i(xi1).
Lemma 1: pit can be factorized as pit(xt) =
∏
i=l,f pi
i
t(x
i
t) where each pi
i
t can be updated through
an update function piit+1 = F
i(piit, γ
i
t, at) and F
i is independent of common agent’s policy ψ. We
also say pit+1 = F (pit, γt, at).
Proof: Please see Appendix A.
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6Definition 1: We call a strategy profile σ Markov PSE (MPSE), if it is a PSE of type θ.
In the next section, we design an algorithm to compute MPSE of the game.
IV. ALGORITHM FOR MPSE COMPUTATION
A. Backward Recursion
In this section, we define an equilibrium generating function θ = (θit)i∈{l,f},t∈[T ], where θ
i
t :
P(X l) × P(X f ) → {X i → P(Ai)} and a sequence of functions (V lt , V
f
t )t∈{1,2,...T+1}, where
V it : P(X
l)× P(X f)× X i → R, in a backward recursive way, as follows.
1. Initialize ∀piT+1 ∈ P(X
l)× P(X f), xiT+1 ∈ X
i, i = l, f ,
V lT+1(piT+1, x
l
T+1)
△
= 0. (7)
V
f
T+1(piT+1, x
f
T+1)
△
= 0 (8)
2. For t = T, T − 1, . . . 1, ∀pit ∈ P(X ), let θt[pit] be generated as follows. Set γ˜t = θt[pit],
where γ˜t = (γ˜lt, γ˜
f
t ) is the solution of the following fixed-point equation. For a given pit, γ
l
t,
define B¯Rt(pit, γlt) as follows,
B¯R
f
t (pit, γ
l
t) =
{
γ˜
f
t : ∀x
f
t ∈ X
f , γ˜
f
t (·|x
f
t ) ∈ arg max
γ
f
t (·|x
f
t )
E
γ
f
t (·|x
f
t )γ
l
t, pit
{
Rlt(Xt, At) + δV
f
t+1(F (pit, γ
l
tγ˜
f
t , At), X
f
t+1)
∣∣pit, xft}} , (9)
where expectation in (9) is with respect to random variables (X lt , At, X
f
t+1)
through the measure pilt(x
l
t)γ
f
t (a
f
t |x
f
t )γ
l
t(a
l
t|x
l
t)Q(x
f
t+1|x
f
t , at) and F is defined in (2).
Then let for all pit, θ[pit] = (γ˜lt, γ˜
f
t ) is a solution of the following fixed-point equation (if it
exists),
γ˜
f
t ∈ B¯R
f
t (pit, γ˜
l
t) (10)
and
γ˜lt ∈ argmax
γlt
E
BR
f
t (γ
l
t)γ
l
t, pit
{
Rlt(Xt, At)+
δV lt+1(F (pit, γ
l
tBR
f
t (γ
l
t), At), X
l
t+1)|pit, x
l
t
}
(11)
where the above expectation is defined with respect to random variables
(Xft , At, X
l
t+1) through the measure pit(x
f
t )γˆ
f
t (a
f
t |x
f
t )γ
l
t(a
l
t|x
l
t)Q(x
l
t+1|x
l
t, at),
and γˆft ∈ BR
f
t (γ
l
t).
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7Let (γ˜lt, γ˜
f
t ) be a pair of solution of the above operation. Then set ∀x
f
t ∈ X
f ,
V
f
t (pit, x
f
t )
△
= Eγ˜
f
t (·|xt)γ˜
l
t, pit
{
R
f
t (Xt, At)+
δV
f
t+1(F (pit, γ˜t, At), X
f
t+1)
∣∣xft } . (12)
V lt (pit, x
l
t)
△
= Eγ˜
f
t γ˜
l
t, pit
{
Rlt(Xt, At) + δV
l
t+1(F (pit, γ˜t, At), X
l
t+1)|x
l
t
}
(13)
B. Forward Recursion
Based on θ defined in the backward recursion above, we now construct a set of strategies σ˜
(through beliefs µ) in a forward recursive way as follows.
1. Initialize at time t = 1, i = l, f ,
µi1[φ](x
i
1) := Q
i(xi1). (14)
2. For t = 1, 2 . . . T, a1:t−1 ∈ Hct+1, x
l
1:t ∈ (X
l)t, xf1:t ∈ (X
f)t, i = l, f
σ˜it(a
i
t|a1:t−1, x
i
1:t) := θ
i
t[µt[h
f
t ]](a
i
t|x
i
t) (15)
µit+1[h
c
t+1] := F
i(µit[h
f
t ], θt[µt[h
f
t ]], at) (16)
where F i is defined in (2).
Theorem 1: A strategy profile σ˜, as constructed through backward/forward recursion algorithm
above is an MPSE of the game
Proof: We will prove this theorem in two parts. In Part 1 for the follower, we prove that
σ˜f ∈ BRft (h
f
t , σ˜
l) i.e. ∀ t ∈ [T ], ∀σf , hft = (a1:t−1, x
f
1:t)
E
σ˜l,σ˜f ,µt
{
T∑
n=t
δn−tRfn(Xn, An)|a1:t−1, x
f
1:t
}
≥
E
σ˜l,σf ,µt
{
T∑
n=t
δn−tRfn(Xn, An)|a1:t−1, x
f
1:t
}
. (17)
In Part 2 for the leader, we show that
E
σ˜l,σ˜f ,µt[a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
δn−tRln(Xn, An)|a1:t−1, x
l
1:t
}
≥
E
σl,BRf (σl),µt[a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
δn−tRln(Xn, An)|a1:t−1, x
l
1:t
}
, (18)
where σ˜f ∈ BRft (h
c
t , σ˜
l), as shown in Part 1.
Combining both the parts prove the above result. The proof is presented in Appendix C.
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8V. INFINITE HORIZON
The above results can be extended to infinite horizon case when the reward functions Rl, Rf
are time homogenous and are absolutely bounded, and δ < 1. In the following, we present the
algorithm, where its proof is presented in the supplementary file.
A. Backward Recursion
Define an equilibrium generating function θ = (θi)i∈{l,f}, where θi : P(X l) × P(X f ) →
{X i → P(Ai)} and a vector of functions (V l, V f ), where V i : P(X l) × P(X f) × X i → R
through the following one-shot fixed-point equation.
Let θ[pi] be generated as follows. Set γ˜ = θ[pi], where γ˜ = (γ˜l, γ˜f) is the solution of the
following fixed-point equation. For a given γl, pi, define BR(pi, γl) as follows, ∀xf ∈ X f ,
BRf (pi, γl) =
{
γ˜f : γ˜f ∈ arg max
γf (·|xf )
E
γf (·|xf )γl, pi
{
Rf(X,A) + δV f(F (pi, γlγ˜f , A), Xf
′
)
∣∣pi, xf}} , (19)
where expectation in (9) is with respect to random variables (X l, A,Xf
′
) through the measure
pil(xl)γf (af |xf )γl(al|xl)Q(xf
′
|xf , a) and F is defined in (2).
Then let (γ˜l, γ˜f , V l, V f ) be a solution of the following fixed-point equation,
γ˜f ∈ BRf (pi, γ˜l) (20)
γ˜l ∈ argmax
γl
E
B¯R
f
t (pitγ
l)γl, pi
{
Rl(X,A) + δV l(F (pi, γlB¯R
f
t (pitγ
l), A), X l
′
)|pi, xl
}
(21)
where the above expectation is defined with respect to random variables (X,A,X ′) through the
measure pi(x)γˆf(af )γl(al)Q(x′|x, a), and γˆ ∈ B¯Rft (pitγ
l). And ∀xf ∈ X f ,
V f(pi, xf ) = Eγ˜
f (·|x)γ˜l, pi
{
Rf(x,A) + δV f(F (pi, γ˜, A), Xf
′
)
∣∣xf} . (22)
V l(pi, xl) = Eγ˜
f γ˜l, pi
{
Rl(X,A) + δV l(F (pi, γ˜, A), X l
′
)
∣∣xl} . (23)
B. Forward Recursion
Based on θ defined above, we now construct a set of strategies σ˜ (through beliefs µ) in a
forward recursive way as follows.
1. Initialize at time t = 1, i = l, f ,
µi1[φ](x
i
1) := Q
i(xi1). (24)
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92. For t = 1, 2 . . . T, a1:t ∈ Hct+1, x
l
1:t ∈ (X
l)t, xf1:t ∈ (X
f)ti = l, f,
σ˜it(a
i
t|a1:t−1, x
i
1:t) := θ
i[µ
t
[hft ]](a
i
t|x
i
t) (25)
µit+1[h
c
t+1] := F
i(µit[h
f
t ], θ
i[µ
t
[hft ]], at) (26)
where F i is defined in (2).
Proof: Please see the supplementary file.
VI. COMPLEXITY
In general, computing a Stackelberg equilibrium involves solving a fixed-point equation in the
space of strategies of both the players for all histories of the game i.e. of the form σ = f(σ)
where f is appropriately defined from (4). For any time t, since σit : A
t−1 × (X i)t → P(Ai),
there exist |P(Ai)||A|
t−1×|X i|t number of possible strategies of the player i = l, f . Since the
complexity at the last time t dominates, solving a Stackelberg equilibrium reduces to solving a
fixed-point equation in the space of ×i=1,2|P(Ai)||A|
T−1×|X i|T number of strategies.
In our algorithm, each time t involves solving a fixed-point equation (10),(11), for every
pit, where pit ∈ P(X l) × P(X f ). Thus computing a Stackelberg equilibrium involves solving
T |P(X l)×P(X f )| smaller fixed-point equations (10) (11). Therefore, our algorithm reduces the
computational dependence on T from double exponential to linear. The complexity of solving
each smaller fixed-point equation depends on the specific model parameters and is an important
direction for future research.
VII. SECURITY EXAMPLE
In this section, we consider a repeated Stackelberg game as a security example. We assume
that X f = Al = Af = {0, 1},X l = φ and type of the defender is static i.e. Q(xt+1|xt, at) =
1(xt+1 = xt). We assume δ = 0.6. Let pl = γl(1), pf,0 = γf (1|0) and pf,1 = γf(1|1) and the
rewards of the players are given in Table I below.
The equilibrium strategies and value functions are provided in Figures 1–3. Interestingly, the
equilibrium strategies of the players are pure strategies that exhibit “complementary discontinu-
ities" [4], [5].
In this paper, we study a general leader/defender, follower/attacker security game where
both the attacker and the defender have private types that evolves as conditionally indepen-
dent controlled Markov process, conditioned on action history. We present a novel dynamic
May 6, 2020 DRAFT
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TABLE I: Game matrix for X=0
X=0 Attacker Attacker
A1 A2
Defender D1 (2, 1) (4, 0)
Defender D2 (1, 0) (3, 2)
TABLE II: Game matrix for X=1
X=1 Attacker Attacker
A1 A2
Defender D1 (3, 2) (2, 0)
Defender D2 (0, 1) (1, 1)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
(1)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
pf
,0
Probability of follower taking action 1 when state is low
(a) Low
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
(1)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
pf
,1
Probability of follower taking action 1 when state is high
(b) High
Fig. 1: Probability of follower taking action 1 when its state is low and high
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
(1)
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
u
f,0
Utility of the follower when the state is low
(a) Low
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
(1)
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
u
f,1
Utility of the follower when the state is high
(b) High
Fig. 2: Utility of the follower when its state is low and high
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0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
(1)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
pl
Probability of leader taking action 1
(a) Probability of leader taking action 1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
(1)
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
u
l
Utility of the leader
(b) Utility of leader
Fig. 3
programing like methodology to sequentially decompose the problem of computing Markov
perfect Stackelberg equilibrium for these games. Based on this algorithm we study a repeated
security game where we numerically compute the equilibrium policies. In general, this algorithm
can further increase the applicability of Stackelberg security games in dynamic security settings
and in dynamic mechanism design where a leader commits to a policy and the follower best
responds to it.
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APPENDIX A
Lemma 2: pit can be factorized as pit(xt) =
∏
i=l,f pi
i
t(x
i
t) where each pi
i
t can be updated through
an update function piit+1 = F
i(piit, γ
i
t, at) and F
i is independent of common agent’s policy ψ. We
also say pit+1 = F (pit, γt, at).
Proof: We prove this by induction. Since pi1(x1) =
∏
i=l,rQ
i
1(x
i
1), the base case is verified.
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Now suppose pit(xt) =
∏
i=l,r pi
i
t(x
i
t). Then,
pit+1(xt+1) = P
ψ(xt+1|a1:t, γ1:t+1) (27a)
= P ψ(xt+1|a1:t, γ1:t) (27b)
=
∑
xt
P ψ(xt, at, xt+1|a1:t−1, γ1:t)∑
x˜t+1x˜t
P ψ(x˜t, x˜t+1, at|a1:t−1, γ1:t)
(27c)
=
∑
xt
pit(xt)
∏N
i=1 γ
i
t(a
i
t|x
i
t)Q
i
t(x
i
t+1|x
i
t, at)∑
x˜tx˜t+1
pit(x˜t)
∏N
i=1 γ
i
t(a
i
t|x˜
i
t)Q
i
t(x˜
i
t+1|x˜
i
t, at)
(27d)
=
∏
i=l,r
∑
xit
piit(x
i
t)γ
i
t(a
i
t|x
i
t)Q
i
t(x
i
t+1|x
i
t, at)∑
x˜it
piit(x˜
i
t)γ
i
t(a
i
t|x˜
i
t)
(27e)
=
∏
i=l,r
piit+1(x
i
t+1), (27f)
where (27e) follows from induction hypothesis. It is assumed in (27c)-(27e) that the denominator
is not 0. If denominator corresponding to any γit is zero, we define
piit+1(x
i
t+1) =
∑
xit
piit(x
i
t)Q
i
t(x
i
t+1|x
i
t, at), (28)
where pit+1 still satisfies (27f). Thus piit+1 = F
i(piit, γ
i
t, at) and pit+1 = F (pit, γt, a1) where F
i
and F are appropriately defined from above.
APPENDIX B
Claim 1: For any policy profile g and ∀t,
P g(x1:t|a1:t−1) =
N∏
i=1
P g
i
(xi1:t|a1:t−1) (29)
Proof:
P g(x1:t|a1:t−1) =
P g(x1:t, a1:t−1)∑
x¯1:t
P g(x¯1:t, a1:t−1)
(30a)
=
∏N
i=1
(
Qi1(x
i
1)g
i
1(a
i
1|x
i
1)
∏t
n=2Q
i
n(x
i
n|x
i
n−1, an−1)g
i
n(a
i
n|a1:n−1, x
i
1:n)
)
∑
x¯1:t
∏N
i=1
(
Qi(x¯i1)g
i
1(a
i
1|x¯
i
1)
∏t
n=2Q
i
n(x¯
i
n|x¯
i
n−1, an−1)g
i
n(a
i
n|a1:n−1, x¯
i
1:n)
) (30b)
=
∏N
i=1
(
Qi1(x
i
1)g
i
1(a
i
1|x
i
1)
∏t
n=2Q
i
n(x
i
n|x
i
n−1, an−1)g
i
n(a
i
n|a1:n−1, x
i
1:n)
)
∏N
i=1
(∑
x¯i1:t
Qi(x¯i1)g
i
1(a
i
1|x¯
i
1)
∏t
n=2Q
i
n(x¯
i
n|x¯
i
n−1, an−1)g
i
n(a
i
n|a1:n−1, x¯
i
1:n)
) (30c)
=
N∏
i=1
Qi1(x
i
1)g
i
1(a
i
1|x
i
1)
∏t
n=2Q
i
n(x
i
n|x
i
n−1, an−1)g
i
n(a
i
n|a1:n−1, x
i
1:n)∑
x¯i1:t
Qi(x¯i1)g
i
1(a
i
1|x¯
i
1)
∏t
n=2Q
i
n(x¯
i
n|x¯
i
n−1, an−1)g
i
n(a
i
n|a1:n−1, x¯
i
1:n)
(30d)
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=
N∏
i=1
P g
i
(xi1:t|a1:t−1) (30e)
APPENDIX C
PART 1: FOLLOWER
Proof: In the following theorem, we will prove that σ˜f ∈ BRft (σ˜
l) ∀ t ∈ [T ], i.e. ∀σf , hft =
(a1:t−1, x
f
1:t)
E
σ˜l,σ˜f ,µt
{
T∑
n=t
δn−tRfn(Xn, An)|a1:t−1, x
f
1:t
}
≥
E
σ˜l,σf ,µt
{
T∑
n=t
δn−tRfn(Xn, An)|a1:t−1, x
f
1:t
}
(31)
This proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 1 in [15]. We reproduce the proof here for
completeness. We prove this using induction and the results in Lemma 3, 4 and 5 proved in
Appendix D. For base case at t = T , ∀(a1:T−1, x
f
1:T ) ∈ H
f
T , σ
f
E
σ˜
f
T
σ˜l
T
, µT [a1:T−1]
{
R
f
T (XT , AT )
∣∣a1:T−1, xf1:T} = V fT (µT [a1:T−1], xfT ) (32a)
≥ Eσ
f
T
σ˜lT , µT [a1:T−1]
{
R
f
T (XT , AT )
∣∣a1:T−1, xf1:T} , (32b)
where (32a) follows from Lemma 5 and (32b) follows from Lemma 3 in Appendix D.
Let the induction hypothesis be that for t+ 1, ∀a1:t ∈ Hct+1, x
f
1:t+1 ∈ (X
f)t+1, σf ,
E
σ˜
f
t+1:T σ˜
l
t+1:T , µt+1[a1:t]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rfn(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t, xf1:t+1
}
(33a)
≥ Eσ
f
t+1:T σ˜
l
t+1:T , µt+1[a1:t]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rfn(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t, xf1:t+1
}
. (33b)
Then ∀(a1:t−1, x
f
1:t) ∈ H
f
t , σ
f , we have
E
σ˜
f
t:T σ˜
l
t:T , µt[a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Rfn(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, xf1:t
}
= V ft (µt[a1:t−1], x
f
t ) (34a)
≥ Eσ
f
t σ˜
l
t, µt[a1:t−1]
{
R
f
t (Xt, At) + V
f
t+1(µt+1[a1:t−1At], X
f
t+1)
∣∣a1:t−1, xf1:t} (34b)
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= Eσ
f
t σ˜
l
t, µt[a1:t−1]
{
R
f
t (Xt, At)+
E
σ˜
f
t+1:T σ˜
l
t+1:T , µt+1[a1:t−1,At]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rfn(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, At, xf1:t, Xft+1
}∣∣a1:t−1, xf1:t
}
(34c)
≥ Eσ
f
t σ˜
l
t, µ
[
ta1:t−1]
{
R
f
t (Xt, At)+
E
σ
f
t+1:T σ˜
l
t+1:Tµt+1[a1:t−1,At]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rfn(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, At, xf1:t, Xft+1
}∣∣a1:t−1, xf1:t
}
(34d)
= Eσ
f
t σ˜
l
t, µt[a1:t−1]
{
R
f
t (Xt, At)+
E
σ
f
t:T σ˜
l
t:Tµt[a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rfn(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, At, xf1:t, Xft+1
}∣∣a1:t−1, xf1:t} (34e)
= Eσ
f
t:T σ˜
l
t:T µt[a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Rfn(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, xf1:t
}
, (34f)
where (34a) follows from Lemma 5, (34b) follows from Lemma 3, (34c) follows from Lemma 5,
(34d) follows from induction hypothesis in (33b) and (34e) follows from Lemma 4. Moreover,
construction of θ in (9), and consequently definition of σ˜ in (15) are pivotal for (34e) to follow
from (34d).
APPENDIX D
Lemma 3: ∀t ∈ T , (a1:t−1, x
f
1:t) ∈ H
f
t , σ
f
t
V
f
t (µt[a1:t−1], x
f
t ) ≥ E
σ
f
t σ˜
l
t, µ
[
ta1:t−1]
{
R
f
t (Xt, At)+
V
f
t+1(F (µt[a1:t−1], σ˜t(·|a1:t−1, ·), At), X
f
t+1)
∣∣a1:t−1, xf1:t} . (35)
Proof: We prove this lemma by contradiction.
Suppose the claim is not true for t. This implies ∃i, σˆft , aˆ1:t−1, xˆ
f
1:t such that
E
σˆ
f
t σ˜
l
t, µt[aˆ1:t−1]
{
R
f
t (Xt, At)+
V
f
t+1(F (µt[aˆ1:t−1], σ˜t(·|aˆ1:t−1, ·), At), X
f
t+1)
∣∣aˆ1:t−1, xˆf1:t} > V ft (µt[aˆ1:t−1], xˆft ). (36)
We will show that this leads to a contradiction.
Construct
γˆ
f
t (a
f
t |x
f
t ) =

 σˆ
f
t (a
f
t |aˆ1:t−1, xˆ
f
1:t) x
f
t = xˆ
f
t
arbitrary otherwise.
(37)
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Then for aˆ1:t−1, xˆ
f
1:t, we have
V
f
t (µt[aˆ1:t−1], xˆ
f
t )
= max
γ
f
t (·|xˆ
f
t )
E
γ
f
t (·|xˆ
f
t )σ˜
l
t, µt[aˆ1:t−1]
{
R
f
t (xˆ
f
t x
l
t, at)+
V
f
t+1(F (µt[aˆ1:t−1], σ˜t(·|aˆ1:t−1, ·), At), X
f
t+1)
∣∣xˆft} , (38a)
≥ Eγˆ
f
t (·|xˆ
f
t )σ˜
l
t, µt[aˆ1:t−1]
{
R
f
t (Xt, At) + V
f
t+1(F (µt[aˆ1:t−1], σ˜t(·|aˆ1:t−1, ·), At), X
f
t+1)
∣∣xˆft } (38b)
=
∑
xlt,at,xt+1
{
R
f
t (xˆ
f
t x
l
t, at) + V
f
t+1(F (µt[aˆ1:t−1], σ˜t(·|aˆ1:t−1, ·), at), x
f
t+1)
}
× µlt[aˆ1:t−1](x
l
t)γˆ
f
t (a
f
t |xˆ
f
t )σ˜
l
t(a
l
t|aˆ1:t−1, x
l
t)Q
f
t (x
f
t+1|xˆ
f
t , at) (38c)
=
∑
xlt,at,xt+1
{
R
f
t (xˆ
f
t x
l
t, at) + V
f
t+1(F (µt[aˆ1:t−1], σ˜t(·|aˆ1:t−1, ·), at), x
f
t+1)
}
× µlt[aˆ1:t−1](x
l
t)σˆ
f
t (a
f
t |aˆ1:t−1, xˆ
f
1:t)σ˜
l
t(a
l
t|aˆ1:t−1, x
l
t)Q
f
t (x
f
t+1|xˆ
f
t , at) (38d)
= Eσˆ
f
t σ˜
l
t,µt[aˆ1:t−1]
{
R
f
t (xˆ
f
t x
l
t, at)+
V
f
t+1(F (µt[aˆ1:t−1], σ˜t(·|aˆ1:t−1, ·), At), X
f
t+1)
∣∣aˆ1:t−1, xˆf1:t} (38e)
> V
f
t (µt[aˆ1:t−1], xˆ
f
t ), (38f)
where (38a) follows from definition of V ft in (12), (38d) follows from definition of γˆ
f
t and (38f)
follows from (36). However this leads to a contradiction.
Lemma 4: ∀t ∈ T , (a1:t, x
f
1:t+1) ∈ H
f
t+1 and σ
f
t
E
σ
f
t:T σ˜
l
t:T , µt[a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rfn(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t, xf1:t+1
}
(39a)
= Eσ
f
t+1:T σ˜
l
t+1:T , µt+1[a1:t]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rfn(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t, xf1:t+1
}
. (39b)
Thus the above quantities do not depend on σft .
Proof: Essentially this claim stands on the fact that µlt+1[a1:t] can be updated from µ
l
t[a1:t−1], σ˜
l
t
and at, as µlt+1[a1:t] = F (µ
l
t[a1:t−1], σ˜
l
t(·|a1:t−1, ·), at) as in Claim 2. Since the above expectations
involve random variables X lt+1, At+1:T , Xt+2:T , we consider the probability
P σ
f
t:T σ˜
l
t:T , µt[a1:t−1](xlt+1, at+1:T , xt+2:T |a1:t, x
f
1:t+1) =
Nr
Dr
(40)
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where
Nr =
∑
xlt
P σ
f
t:T σ˜
l
t:T , µt[a1:t−1](xlt, at, xt+1, at+1:T , xt+2:T |a1:t−1, x
f
1:t) (41a)
=
∑
xlt
P σ
f
t:T σ˜
l
t:T , µt[a1:t−1](xlt
∣∣a1:t−1, xf1:t)σft (aft |a1:t−1, xf1:t)σ˜lt(alt|a1:t−1, xlt)
Q(xt+1|xt, at)P
σ
f
t:T σ˜
l
t:T , µt[a1:t−1](at+1:T , xt+2:T |a1:t, x
f
1:t−1, xt:t+1) (41b)
=
∑
xlt
µlt[a1:t−1](x
l
t)σ
f
t (a
f
t |a1:t−1, x
f
1:t)σ˜
l
t(a
l
t|a1:t−1, x
l
t)Q
f (xft+1|x
f
t , at)Q
l(xlt+1|x
l
t, at)
P σ
f
t+1:T σ˜
l
t+1:T , µt+1[a1:t](at+1:T , xt+2:T |a1:t, x
f
1:t, xt+1), (41c)
where (41c) follows from the conditional independence of types given common information, as
shown in Claim 1, and the fact that probability on (at+1:T , x2+t:T ) given
a1:t, x
f
1:t−1, xt:t+1, µt[a1:t−1] depends on a1:t, x
f
1:t, xt+1, µt+1[a1:t] through σ
l
t+1:T σ˜
l
t+1:T . Similarly,
the denominator in (40) is given by
Dr =
∑
x˜lt
P σ
f
t:T σ˜
l
t:T , µt[a1:t−1](x˜lt, at, x
f
t+1
∣∣a1:t−1, xf1:t)
∑
x˜lt
P σ
f
t:T σ˜
l
t:T , µt(x˜lt|a1:t−1, x
f
1:t)σ
f
t (a
f
t |a1:t−1, x
f
1:t)σ˜
l
t(a
l
t|a1:t−1, x˜
l
t)Q
f (xft+1|x
f
t , at) (41d)
=
∑
x˜lt
µlt[a1:t−1](x˜
l
t)σ
f
t (a
f
t |a1:t−1, x
f
1:t)σ˜
l
t(a
l
t|a1:t−1, x˜
l
t)Q
f(xft+1|x
f
t , at). (41e)
By canceling the terms σft (·) and Q
f(·) in the numerator and the denominator, (40) is given
by ∑
xlt
µlt[a1:t−1](x
l
t)σ˜
l
t(a
l
t|a1:t−1, x
l
t)Q
l
t+1(x
l
t+1|x
l
t, at)∑
x˜lt
µlt[a1:t−1](x˜
l
t)σ˜
l
t(a
l
t|a1:t−1, x˜
l
t)
× P σ
f
t+1:T σ˜
l
t+1:T , µt+1[a1:t](at+1:T , xt+2:T |a1:t, x
f
1:t, xt+1) (41f)
= µlt+1[a1:t](x
l
t+1)P
σ
f
t+1:T σ˜
l
t+1:T , µt+1[a1:t](at+1:T , xt+2:T |a1:t, x
f
1:t, xt+1) (41g)
= P σ
f
t+1:T σ˜
l
t+1:T , µt+1[a1:t](xlt+1, at+1:T , xt+2:T |a1:t, x
f
1:t+1), (41h)
where (41g) follows from using the definition of µlt+1[a1:t](x
l
t) in the forward recursive step in
(16) and the definition of the belief update in (27).
Lemma 5: ∀t ∈ T , (a1:t−1, x
f
1:t) ∈ H
f
t ,
V
f
t (µt[a1:t−1], x
f
t ) = E
σ˜
f
t:T σ˜
l
t:T ,µt[a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Rfn(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, xf1:t
}
. (42)
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Proof: We prove the lemma by induction. For t = T ,
E
σ˜
f
T
σ˜l
T
, µT [a1:T−1]
{
R
f
T (XT , AT )
∣∣a1:T−1, xf1:T}
=
∑
xl
T
aT
R
f
T (xT , aT )µT [a1:T−1](x
l
T )σ˜
f
T (a
f
T |a1:T−1, x
f
T )σ˜
l
T (a
l
T |a1:T−1, x
l
T ) (43a)
= V fT (µT [a1:T−1], x
f
T ), (43b)
where (43b) follows from the definition of V ft in (12) and the definition of σ˜T in the forward
recursion in (15).
Suppose the claim is true for t+ 1, i.e., ∀t ∈ T , (a1:t, x
f
1:t+1) ∈ H
f
t+1
V
f
t+1(µt+1[a1:t], x
f
t+1) = E
σ˜
f
t+1:T σ˜
l
t+1:T , µt+1[a1:t]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rfn(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t, xf1:t+1
}
. (44)
Then ∀t ∈ T , (a1:t−1, x
f
1:t) ∈ H
f
t , we have
E
σ˜
f
t:T σ˜
l
t:T , µt[a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Rfn(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, xf1:t
}
= Eσ˜
f
t:T σ˜
l
t:T , µt[a1:t−1]
{
R
f
t (Xt, At) + E
σ˜
f
t:T σ˜
l
t:T , µt[a1:t−1]{
T∑
n=t+1
Rfn(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, At, xf1:t, Xft+1
}∣∣a1:t−1, xf1:t
}
(45a)
= Eσ˜
f
t:T σ˜
l
t:T , µt[a1:t−1]
{
R
f
t (Xt, At)+{
T∑
n=t+1
Rfn(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, At, xf1:t, Xft+1
}∣∣a1:t−1, xf1:t
}
(45b)
= Eσ˜
f
t:T σ˜
l
t:T , µt[a1:t−1]
{
R
f
t (Xt, At) + V
f
t+1(µt+1[a1:t−1At], X
f
t+1)
∣∣a1:t−1, xf1:t} (45c)
= Eσ˜
f
t σ˜
l
t, µt[a1:t−1]
{
R
f
t (Xt, At) + V
f
t+1(µt+1[a1:t−1At], X
f
t+1)
∣∣a1:t−1, xf1:t} (45d)
= V ft (µt[a1:t−1], x
f
t ), (45e)
where (45b) follows from Lemma 4 in Appendix D, (45c) follows from the induction hypothesis
in (44), (45d) follows because the random variables involved in expectation, X lt , At, X
f
t+1 do
not depend on σ˜ft+1:T σ˜
l
t+1:T and (45e) follows from the definition of σ˜t in the forward recursion
in (15), the definition of µt+1 in (16) and the definition of V
f
t in (12).
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APPENDIX E
PART 2: LEADER
In the following we will show that, ∀σl
E
σ˜l,σ˜f ,µt
{
T∑
n=t
δn−tRln(Xn, An)|h
l
t
}
≥ Eσ
l,BRf (σl),µt
{
T∑
n=t
δn−tRln(Xn, An)|h
l
t
}
, (46)
where σ˜f ∈ BRf (σ˜l), as shown in Part 1.
Proof: We prove the above result using induction and from results in Lemma 13 and 7
proved in Appendix F.
For base case at t = T , ∀(a1:T−1, xl1:T ) ∈ H
l
T , σ
l
E
σ˜
f
T
σ˜lT , µT [a1:T−1]
{
Rlt(XT , AT )
∣∣a1:T−1, xl1:T}
= V lT (µt[a1:T−1], x
l
T ) (47a)
≥ EBR
f (σl)σl
T
, µT [a1:T−1]
{
Rlt(XT , AT )
∣∣a1:T−1, xl1:T} . (47b)
where (47a) follows from Lemma 7 and (47b) follows from Lemma 13 in Appendix F. Let the
induction hypothesis be that for t+ 1, ∀(a1:t, xl1:t) ∈ H
l
t+1, σ
l,
E
σ˜
f
t+1:T σ˜
l
t+1:T , µt+1[a1:t]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rln(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:n−1, xl1:n
}
≥ EBR
f (σl
t+1:T )σ
l
t+1:T , µt+1[a1:t]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rln(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:n−1, xl1:n
}
(48a)
Then ∀(a1:t−1, xl1:t) ∈ H
l
t, σ
l, we have
E
σ˜
f
t:T σ˜
l
t:T , µt[a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Rln(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, xl1:t
}
= V lt (µt[a1:t−1], x
l
t) (49a)
≥ EBR
f (µt[a1:t−1],γlt)γ
l
t, µt[a1:t−1]
{
Rlt(Xt, At)+
V
f
t+1(F (µt[a1:t−1], γ
l
tBR(γ
l
t), At), X
l
t+1)
∣∣xlt} (49b)
= EBR
f (σlt)σ
l
t, µt[a1:t−1]
{
Rlt(Xt, At) + E
BRf (σ˜lt+1:T )σ˜
l
t+1:T , F (µt[a1:t−1],γ
l
tBR(γ
l
t),At){
T∑
n=t+1
Rln(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, At, xl1:t, X lt+1} ∣∣a1:t−1, xl1:t
}
(49c)
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≥ EBR
f (σlt)σ
l
t, µt[a1:t−1]
{
Rlt(Xt, At) + E
BRf (σl
t+1:T )σ
l
t+1:TF (µt[a1:t−1],γ
l
tBR(γ
l
t),At){
T∑
n=t+1
Rln(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, At, xl1:t, X lt+1} ∣∣a1:t−1, xl1:t
}
(49d)
= EBR
f (σlt)σ
l
t, µt[a1:t−1]
{
Rlt(Xt, At)+
E
BRf (σlt:T )σ
l
t:Tµt[a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rln(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, At, xl1:t, X lt+1} ∣∣a1:t−1, xl1:t
}
(49e)
= EBR
f (σl
t:T )σ
l
t:T µt[a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Rln(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, xl1:t
}
, (49f)
where (49a) follows from Lemma 7, (49b) follows from Lemma 13, (49c) follows from Lemma 7
and γlt in (49c) satisfy ∀x
l
t, xt+1 (such a γ
l
t exists from Lemma 9),
γlt(a
l
t|x
l
t) = σ
l
t(a
l
t|a1:t−1, x
l
1:t) (50)
F (µ
t
[a1:t−1], γ
l
t, B¯R
f
t (pit, γ
l
t), at)(xt+1) = P
BRf (σ˜l1:t−1σ
l
t)σ˜
l
1:t−1σ
l
t(xt+1|a1:t) (51)
(49d) follows from induction hypothesis in (48a) and (49e) follows from (27).
APPENDIX F
Lemma 6: ∀t ∈ [T ], (a1:t−1, x
l
1:t) ∈ H
l
t, σ
l
t
V
f
t (µt[a1:t−1], x
l
t) ≥ E
BRf (σlt)σ
l
t µt[a1:t−1]
{
Rlt(Xt, At)+
V lt+1(F (µt[a1:t−1], γ
l
t, B¯R
f
t (pit, γ
l
t), At), X
l
t+1)
∣∣a1:t−1, xl1:t} (52)
where γlt satisfies ∀xt+1 (such a γ
l
t exists from Lemma 9),
γlt(a
l
t|x
l
t) = σ
l
t(a
l
t|a1:t−1, x
l
1:t) (53)
F (µt[a1:t−1], γ
l
t, B¯R
f
t (pit, γ
l
t), at)(xt+1) = P
BRf (σ˜l1:t−1σ
l
tσ˜
l
t+1:T )σ˜
l
1:t−1σ
l
tσ˜t+1:T (xt+1|a1:t) (54)
Proof: We prove this lemma by contradiction. Suppose the claim is not true for t. This
implies ∃σˆl, aˆ1:t−1, xˆl1:t such that
E
BRf (σˆlt)σˆ
l
t, µt[aˆ1:t−1]
{
Rlt(Xt, At)+
V
f
t+1(F (µt[aˆ1:t−1], γˆ
l
tBR
f (µ
t
[aˆ1:t−1], γˆ
l
t), At), X
l
t+1)
∣∣aˆ1:t−1, xˆl1:t}
> V
f
t (µt[aˆ1:t−1], xˆ
l
t), (55)
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where γˆlt satisfies (such a γˆ
l
t exists from Lemma 9)
γˆlt(a
l
t|x
l
t) = σˆ
l
t(a
l
t|aˆ1:t−1, xˆ
l
1:t) if x
l
t = xˆ
l
t (56)
F (µt[aˆ1:t−1], γˆ
l
t, BR
f(µ
t
[aˆ1:t−1], γˆ
l
t), at)(xt+1)
= PBR
f (σ˜l1:t−1σˆ
l
tσ˜
l
t+1:T )σ˜
l
1:t−1σˆ
l
tσ˜
l
t+1:T (xt+1|aˆ1:t−1, at) (57)
Then for aˆ1:t−1, we have
V lt (µt[aˆ1:t−1], xˆ
l
t) (58a)
= max
γlt
E
γltB¯R
f
t (pit,γ
l
t)µt[aˆ1:t−1]
{
Rlt(Xt, At)+
V lt+1(F (µt[aˆ1:t−1], γ
l
tBR
f (µ
t
[aˆ1:t−1], γ
l
t), A
f
t ), X
l
t+1)
∣∣xˆlt} (58b)
≥ Eγˆ
l
t(·|xˆt)BR
f (pit,γˆlt), µt[aˆ1:t−1]
{
Rlt(Xt, At)+
V lt+1(F (µt[aˆ1:t−1], γˆ
l
tBR
f (µ
t
[aˆ1:t−1], γˆ
l
t), At), X
l
t+1)
∣∣xˆlt} (58c)
= Eσˆ
l
tB¯R
f
(pit,σˆlt)µt[aˆ1:t−1]
{
Rlt(Xt, At)+
V lt+1(F (µt[aˆ1:t−1], γˆ
l
tBR
f (µ
t
[aˆ1:t−1], γˆ
l
t), At), X
l
t+1)
∣∣aˆ1:t−1, xˆl1:t} (58d)
> V lt (µt[aˆ1:t−1], xˆ
l
t) (58e)
where (58b) follows from definition of V lt in (12), (58d) follows from definition of γˆ
l
t and (58e)
follows from (55). However this leads to a contradiction.
Lemma 7: ∀t ∈ [T ], (a1:t−1, x
l
1:t) ∈ H
l
T
V lt (µt[a1:t−1], x
l
t) = E
σ˜
f
t:T σ˜
l
t:T ,µt[a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Rln(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, xl1:t
}
. (59)
Proof: We prove the lemma by induction. For t = T ,
E
σ˜
f
T
σ˜l
T
, µT [a1:T−1]
{
RlT (XT , AT )
∣∣a1:T−1, xl1:T}
=
∑
xT ,aT
µ
f
t [a1:t−1](x
f
T )R
l
T (xT , aT )σ˜
f
T (a
l
T |a1:T−1, x
l
T )σ˜
l
T (a
l
T |a1:T−1, x
l
T ) (60a)
= V lT (µT [a1:T−1], x
l
T ), (60b)
where (60b) follows from the definition of V lt in (12) and the definition of σ˜T in the forward
recursion in (15).
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Suppose the claim is true for t+ 1, i.e., ∀t ∈ [T ], (a1:t, xl1:t+1) ∈ H
l
t+1
V lt+1(µt+1[a1:t], x
l
t+1) = E
σ˜
f
t+1:T σ˜
l
t+1:T , µt+1[a1:t]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rln(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t, xl1:t+1
}
. (61)
Then ∀t ∈ [T ], (a1:t−1, xl1:t) ∈ H
l
t, we have
E
σ˜
f
t:T σ˜
l
t:T , µt[a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Rln(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, xl1:t
}
= Eσ˜
f
t:T σ˜
l
t:T , µt[a1:t−1]
{
Rlt(Xt, At)+
E
σ˜
f
t:T σ˜
l
t:T , µt[a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rln(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, At, xl1:t, X lt+1} ∣∣a1:t−1, xl1:t
}
(62a)
= Eσ˜
f
t:T σ˜
l
t:T , µt[a1:t−1]
{
Rlt(Xt, At)+
E
σ˜
f
t+1:T σ˜
l
t+1:T , µt+1[a1:t−1,At]
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rln(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, At, xl1:t, X lt+1} ∣∣a1:t−1, xl1:t
}
(62b)
= Eσ˜
f
t:T σ˜
l
t:T , µt[a1:t−1]
{
Rlt(Xt, At) + V
l
t+1(µt+1[a1:t−1At], X
l
t+1)
∣∣a1:t−1, xl1:t} (62c)
= Eσ˜
f
T
σ˜l
T
, µt[a1:t−1]
{
Rlt(Xt, At) + V
l
t+1(µt+1[a1:t−1At], X
l
t+1)
∣∣a1:t−1, xl1:t} (62d)
= V lt (µt[a1:t−1], x
l
t), (62e)
where (62b) follows from an identical argument for leader as Lemma 4 in Appendix D, (62c)
follows from the induction hypothesis in (61), (62d) follows because the random variables
involved in expectation, X lt , At, Xt+1 do not depend on σ˜
f
t+1:T σ˜
l
t+1:T and (62e) follows from
the definition of σ˜t in the forward recursion in (15), the definition of µt+1 in (16) and the
definition of V lt in (12).
Lemma 8: Let σˆf = BRf (σ˜l1:t−1σ
l
tσ˜
l
t+1:T ) and γˆ
f
t = B¯R
f
t (pit[a1:t−1], γ
l
t). Then
∀aft , a1:t−1, x
f
1:t, γˆ
f
t (a
f
t |x
f
t ) = σˆ
f
t (a
f
t |a1:t−1, x
f
1:t), where,
BRf (σl) :=
⋂
t
⋂
h
f
t
argmax
σf
E
σl,σf
{
T∑
n=t
δn−tRfn(Xn, An)|h
f
t
}
(63)
B¯R
f
t (pit[a1:t−1], γ
l
t) =
{
γ˜
f
t : ∀x
f
t ∈ X
f , γ˜
f
t (·|x
f
t ) ∈ arg max
γ
f
t (·|x
f
t )
E
γ
f
t (·|x
f
t )γ
l
t, pit
{
R
f
t (Xt, At) + δV
f
t+1(F (pit, γ
l
tγ˜
f
t , At), X
f
t+1)
∣∣pit, xft }} , (64)
where
pit[a1:t−1](xt) = P
σ˜l1:t−1σ
l
t,σˆ
f
1:t(xt|a1:t−1). (65)
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Proof:
max
γ
f
t (·|x
f
t )
E
γ
f
t (·|x
f
t )γ
l
t, pit
{
R
f
t (Xt, At) + δV
f
t+1(F (pit, γ
l
tγ˜
f
t , At), X
f
t+1)
∣∣pit[a1:t−1], xft}
= max
γ
f
t (·|x
f
t )
E
γ
f
t (·|x
f
t )γ
l
t, pit
{
R
f
t (Xt, At)+
E
σ˜lt+1:T ,σ˜
f
t+1:T ,F (pit,γ
l
tγ˜
f
t ,At)
{
T∑
n=t+1
δn−tRfn(Xn, An)|h
f
t
}∣∣pit[a1:t−1], xft
}
(66a)
= max
γ
f
t (·|x
f
t )
E
γ
f
t (·|x
f
t )γ
l
t, pit
{
R
f
t (Xt, At)+
E
σ
f
t σ˜
f
t+1:Tσ
l
tσ˜
l
t+1:T pit
{ T∑
n=t+1
Rfn(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, At, xf1:t, Xft+1}∣∣a1:t−1, xf1:t} (66b)
= max
γ
f
t (·|x
f
t )
E
γ
f
t (·|x
f
t )γ
l
t, pit
{
R
f
t (Xt, At)+
E
σ˜l1:t−1σ
l
tσ˜
l
t+1:T ,σˆ
f
1:t−1σ
f
t σ˜
f
t+1:T
{ T∑
n=t+1
Rfn(Xn, An)
∣∣a1:t−1, At, xf1:t, Xft+1}∣∣a1:t−1, xf1:t} (66c)
= max
σ
f
t
E
σ˜l1:t−1σ
l
tσ˜
l
t+1:T ,σˆ
f
1:t−1σ
f
t σ˜
f
t+1:T
{
R
f
t (Xt, At)+
E
σ˜l1:t−1σ
l
tσ˜
l
t+1:T ,σˆ
f
1:t−1σ
f
t σ˜
f
t+1:T
{
T∑
n=t+1
δn−tRfn(Xn, An)|h
f
t
}}
(66d)
= max
σ
f
t
E
σ˜l1:t−1σ
l
tσ˜
l
t+1:T ,σˆ
f
1:t−1σ
f
t σ˜
f
t+1:T
{
T∑
n=t
δn−tRfn(Xn, An)|h
f
t
}
(66e)
= max
σ
f
t:T
E
σ˜l1:t−1σ
l
tσ˜
l
t+1:T ,σˆ
f
1:t−1σ
f
t:T
{
T∑
n=t
δn−tRfn(Xn, An)|h
f
t
}
(66f)
= Eσ˜
l
1:t−1σ
l
tσ˜
l
t+1:T ,σˆ
f
{
T∑
n=t
δn−tRfn(Xn, An)|h
f
t
}
(66g)
where (66a) follows from Lemma 5 in Appendix D, (66b) follows from Lemma 4 in Appendix D,
(66c) follows from the definition of pit in (65), (66f) follows from (17), and (66g) follows from
the definition of σˆ .
Lemma 9: Let σ˜ be an MPSE. For any given σlt, a1:t−1, x
l
1:t, let
γlt(a
l
t|x
l
t) = σ
l
t(a
l
t|a1:t−1, x
l
1:t) (67)
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Then
PBR
f
t (a1:t−1,σ˜
l
1:t−1σ
l
tσ˜
l
t+1:T )σ˜
l
1:t−1σ
l
tσ˜
l
t+1:T (xt+1|a1:t)
= F (µt[a1:t−1], γ
l
t, B¯R
f
t (µt[a1:t−1], γ
l
t), at)(xt+1) (68)
Proof: Let σft = [BR
f
t (a1:t−1, σ˜
l
1:t−1σ
l
tσ˜
l
t+1:T )]t and γ
f
t = B¯R
f
t (µt[a1:t−1], γ
l
t). Then from
Lemma 8, ∀aft , a1:t−1, x
f
1:t, γ
f
t (a
f
t |x
f
t ) = σ
f
t (a
f
t |a1:t−1, x
f
1:t), ∀a
f
t , x
f
t . Thus
PBR
f
t (a1:t−1,σ˜
l
1:t−1σ
l
t)σ˜
l
1:t−1σ
l
t(xt+1|a1:t)
=
∑
x1:t
P a1:t−1,BR
f
t (a1:t−1,σ˜
l
1:t−1σ
l
t)σ˜
l
1:t−1σ
l
t(x1:t, at, xt+1|a1:t−1)∑
x1:t
PBR
f
t (a1:t−1,σ˜
l
1:t−1σ
l
t)σ˜
l
1:t−1σ
l
t(x1:t, at|a1:t−1)
(69)
=
∑
x1:t
PBR
f
t (a1:t−1,σ˜
l
1:t−1σ
l
t)σ˜
l
1:t−1σ
l
t(x1:t)σ
l
t(a
l
t|a1:t−1, x
l
1:t)σ
f
t (a
f
t |a1:t−1, x
f
1:t)
Q(xt+1|xt, at)∑
x1:t
PBR
f (a1:t−1,σ˜l1:t−1σ
l
t)σ˜
l
1:t−1σ
l
t(x1:t)σlt(a
l
t|a1:t−1, x
l
1:t)σ
f
t (a
f
t |a1:t−1, x
f
1:t)
(70)
=
∑
xt
PBR
f
t (a1:t−1,σ˜
l
1:t−1σ
l
t)σ˜
l
1:t−1σ
l
t(xt)γ
l
t(a
l
t|x
l
t)γ
f
t (a
f
t |x
f
t )Q(xt+1|xt, at)∑
xt
PBR
f (a1:t−1,σ˜l1:t−1σ
l
t)σ˜
l
1:t−1σ
l
t(xt)γlt(a
l
t|x
l
t)γ
f
t (a
f
t |x
f
t )
(71)
=
∑
xt
µt[a1:t−1](xt)γ
l
t(a
l
t|x
l
t)γ
f
t (a
f
t |x
f
t )Q(xt+1|xt, at)∑
xt
µt[a1:t−1](xt)γ
l
t(a
l
t|x
l
t)γ
f
t (a
f
t |x
f
t )
(72)
= F (µt[a1:t−1], γ
l
t, B¯R
f
t (µt[a1:t−1], γ
l
t), at)(xt+1) (73)
APPENDIX G
Part of the following proof (corresponding to the follower) is identical to the proof of Theo-
rem 3 in [15]. It is reproduced for the sake of completion. We divide the proof into two parts:
first we show that for i = l, f the value function V i is at least as big as any reward-to-go
function; secondly we show that under the strategy σ˜i, reward-to-go is V i.
Part 1: For any σf define the following reward-to-go functions
W
f,σf
t (h
f
t ) = E
σf ,σ˜l,µt[hct ]
{
∞∑
n=t
δn−tRf(Xn, An) | h
f
t
}
(74a)
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W
f,σf ,T
t (h
f
t ) = E
σf ,σ˜l,µt[hct ]
{
T∑
n=t
δn−tRf (Xn, An) (74b)
+ δT+1−tV f (ΠT+1, X
f
T+1) | h
f
t
}
. (74c)
W
l,σl
t (h
l
t) = E
σl,BRf (σl),µt[hct ]
{
∞∑
n=t
δn−tRl(Xn, An) | h
l
t
}
(74d)
W
l,σl,T
t (h
l
t) = E
σl,BRf (σl),µt[hct ]
{
T∑
n=t
δn−tRl(Xn, An) (74e)
+ δT+1−tV l(ΠT+1, X
l
T+1) | h
l
t
}
. (74f)
Since X i,Ai are finite sets the reward Ri is absolutely bounded, the reward-to-go W i,σ
i
t (h
i
t) is
finite ∀ i, t, σi, hit.
For any hit ∈ H
i
t,
V i
(
µ
t
[hct ], x
i
t
)
−W i,σ
i
t (h
i
t) =
[
V i
(
µ
t
[hct ], x
i
t
)
−W i,σ
i,T
t (h
i
t)
]
(75)
+
[
W
i,σi,T
t (h
i
t)−W
i,σi
t (h
i
t)
]
(76)
Combining results from Lemmas 10 and 11 the term in the first bracket in RHS of (75) is
non-negative. Using (74), the term in the second bracket is
(
δT+1−t
)
E
σi,σ˜l,µt[hct ]
{
−
∞∑
n=T+1
δn−(T+1)Ri(Xn, An) (77)
+V i(ΠT+1, X
i
T+1) | h
i
t
}
. (78)
The summation in the expression above is bounded by a convergent geometric series. Also, V i
is bounded. Hence the above quantity can be made arbitrarily small by choosing T appropriately
large. Since the LHS of (75) does not depend on T , this results in
V i
(
µ
t
[hct ], x
i
t
)
≥W i,σ
i
t (h
i
t). (79)
Part 2: Since the strategy σ˜ generated in (25) is such that σ˜it depends on h
i
t only through
µ
t
[hct ] and x
i
t, the reward-to-go W
i,σ˜i
t , at strategy σ˜, can be written (with abuse of notation) as
W
i,σ˜i
t (h
i
t) =W
i,σ˜i
t (µt[h
c
t ], x
i
t) (80)
= Eσ˜,µt[h
c
t ]
{
∞∑
n=t
δn−tRi(Xn, An) | µt[h
c
t ], x
i
t
}
. (81)
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For any hit ∈ H
i
t,
W
i,σ˜i
t (µt[h
c
t ], x
i
t) = E
σ˜,µt[hct ]
{
Ri(Xt, At) + δW
i,σ˜i
t+1(
F (µ
t
[hct ], θ[µt[h
c
t ]], At+1), X
i
t+1
)
| µ
t
[hct ], x
i
t
}
(82a)
V i(µ
t
[hct ], x
i
t) = E
σ˜,µt[hct ]
{
Ri(Xt, At) + δV
i
(
F (µ
t
[hct ], θ[µt[h
c
t ]], At+1), X
i
t+1
)
| µ
t
[hct ], x
i
t
}
. (82b)
Repeated application of the above for the first n time periods gives
W
i,σ˜i
t (µt[h
c
t ], x
i
t) = E
σ˜,µt[hct ]
{
t+n−1∑
m=t
δm−tRi(Xt, At) (83a)
+δnW i,σ˜
i
t+n
(
Πt+n, X
i
t+n
)
| µ
t
[hct ], x
i
t
}
(83b)
(83c)
V i(µ
t
[hct ], x
i
t) = E
σ˜,µt[hct ]
{
t+n−1∑
m=t
δm−tRi(Xt, At) (83d)
+δnV i
(
Πt+n, X
i
t+n
)
| µ
t
[hct ], x
i
t
}
. (83e)
Here Πt+n is the n−step belief update under strategy and belief prescribed by σ˜, µ.
Taking differences results in
W
i,σ˜i
t (µt[h
c
t ], x
i
t)− V
i(µ
t
[hct ], x
i
t) = δ
n
E
σ˜,µt[hct ] (84){
W
i,σ˜i
t+n
(
Πt+n, X
i
t+n
)
− V i
(
Πt+n, X
i
t+n
)
| µ
t
[hct ], x
i
t
}
. (85)
Taking absolute value of both sides then using Jensen’s inequality for f(x) = |x| and finally
taking supremum over hit reduces to
sup
hit
∣∣W i,σ˜it (µt[hct ], xit)− V i(µt[hct ], xit)∣∣ ≤ δn sup
hit
E
σ˜,µt[hct ] (86)
{∣∣W i,σ˜it+n(Πt+n, X it+n)− V i(µt[hct ], xit)∣∣ | µt[hct ], xit
}
. (87)
Now using the fact that Wt+n, V i are bounded and that we can choose n arbitrarily large, we
get suphit |W
i,σ˜i
t (µt[h
c
t ], x
i
t)− V
i(µ
t
[hct ], x
i
t)| = 0.
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APPENDIX H
PART 1:FOLLOWER
In this section, we present four lemmas. Lemma 10 and 11 are intermediate technical results
needed in the proof of Lemma 12. Then the results in Lemma 12 and 15 are used in the previous
section for the proof of Theorem 3. The proofs for Lemma 10 and 11 below aren’t stated as
they are analogous (the only difference being a non-zero terminal reward in the finite horizon
model) to the proofs of Lemma 3 and 4 from Appendix D, used in the proof of Theorem 1.
Define the reward-to-go W f,σ
f ,T
t for the follower and strategy σ
f as
W
f,σf ,T
t (h
f
t ) = E
σf ,σ˜l,µt[hct ]
[ T∑
n=t
δn−tRf(Xn, An) + δ
T+1−tGf (ΠT+1, X
f
T+1) | h
f
t
]
. (88)
Here agent i’s strategy is σf whereas leader uses strategy σ˜l defined above. Since X f ,Af are
assumed to be finite and Gf absolutely bounded, the reward-to-go is finite ∀ i, t, σf , hft .
In the following, any quantity with a T in the superscript refers the finite horizon model with
terminal reward Gf .
Lemma 10: For any t ∈ T , hft and σ
f ,
V
f,T
t (µt[h
c
t ], x
f
t )
≥ Eσ
f ,σ˜l,µt[hct ]
[
Rf(Xt, At) + δV
f,T
t+1
(
F (µ
t
[hct ], σ˜t(·|µt[h
c
t ], ·), At), X
f
t+1
)
| hft
]
. (89)
Lemma 11:
E
σ
f
t+1:T ,σ˜
l
t+1:T ,µt+1[h
c
t ,at]
[ T∑
n=t+1
δn−(t+1)Rf(Xn, An)+
δT+1−tGf(ΠT+1, X
f
T+1) | h
f
t , at, x
f
t+1
]
(90)
= Eσ
f
t:T ,σ˜
l
t:T ,µt[h
c
t ]
[ T∑
n=t+1
δn−(t+1)Rf(Xn, An)+
δT+1−tGf(ΠT+1, X
f
T+1) | h
f
t , at, x
f
t+1
]
. (91)
The result below shows that the value function from the backwards recursive algorithm is higher
than any reward-to-go.
Lemma 12: For any t ∈ T , hft and σ
f ,
V
f,T
t (µt[h
c
t ], x
f
t ) ≥W
f,σf ,T
t (h
f
t ). (92)
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Proof 1: We use backward induction for this. At time T , using the maximization property
from (9) (modified with terminal reward Gf ),
V
f,T
T (µT [h
c
T ], x
f
T ) (93a)
= Eγ˜
f,T
T
(·|xf
T
),γ˜l,T
T
,µT [h
c
t ]
[
Rf(XT , AT ) + δG
f
(
F (µ
T
[hcT ], γ˜
T
T , AT ), X
f
T+1
)
| µ
T
[hcT ], x
f
T
]
(93b)
≥ Eγ
f,T
T
(·|xf
T
),γ˜l,T
T
,µT [h
c
t ]
[
Rf (XT , AT ) + δG
f
(
F (µ
T
[hcT ], γ˜
T
T , AT ), X
f
T+1
)
| µ
T
[hcT ], x
f
T
]
(93c)
= W f,σ
f ,T
T (h
f
T ) (93d)
Here the second inequality follows from (9) and (12) and the final equality is by definition
in (88).
Assume that the result holds for all n ∈ {t+ 1, . . . , T}, then at time t we have
V
f,T
t (µt[h
c
t ], x
f
t ) (94a)
≥ Eσ
f
t ,σ˜
l
t,µt[h
c
t ]
[
Rf (Xt, At) + δV
f,T
t+1
(
F (µ
t
[hct ], σ˜t(·|µt[h
c
t ], ·), At), X
f
t+1
)
| hft
]
(94b)
≥ Eσ
f
t ,σ˜
l
t,µt[h
c
t ]
[
Rf (Xt, At) + δE
σ
f
t+1:T ,σ˜
l
t+1:T ,µt+1[h
c
t ,At]
[ T∑
n=t+1
δn−(t+1)Rf(Xn, An) (94c)
+ δT−tGf(ΠT+1, X
f
T+1) | h
f
t , At, X
f
t+1
]
| hft
]
= Eσ
f
t:T ,σ˜
l
t:T ,µt[h
c
t ]
[ T∑
n=t
δn−tRf(Xn, An) + δ
T+1−tGf(ΠT+1, X
f
T+1) | h
f
t
]
(94d)
=W f,σ
f ,T
t (h
f
t ) (94e)
Here the first inequality follows from Lemma 10, the second inequality from the induction
hypothesis, the third equality follows from Lemma 11 and the final equality by definition (88).
APPENDIX I
PART 2: LEADER
In this section, we present three lemmas. Lemma 13 is an intermediate technical result needed
in the proof of Lemma 14. Then the results in Lemma 14 are used in the previous section for
the proof of Theorem 3. The proof for Lemma 13 below isnt stated as it is analogous (the
only difference being a non-zero terminal reward in the finite horizon model) to the proofs of
Lemma 3 from Appendix F, used in the proof of Theorem 1.
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Define the reward-to-go W l,σ
l,T
t for the leader and strategy σ
l as
W
l,σl,T
t (h
l
t) = E
σl,BRl(σl),µt[hct ]
[ T∑
n=t
δn−tRl(Xn, An) + δ
T+1−tGl(ΠT+1, X
l
T+1) | h
l
t
]
. (95)
where ΠT+1(xt+1) = P σ
l,BRl(σl)(xT+1|ht), ∀xT+1. Since X l,Al are assumed to be finite and Gl
absolutely bounded, the reward-to-go is finite ∀ t, σl, hlt.
In the following, any quantity with a T in the superscript refers the finite horizon model with
terminal reward Gl.
Lemma 13: ∀t ∈ [T ], (a1:t−1, x
l
1:t) ∈ H
l
t, σ
l
t
V
f
t (µt[a1:t−1], x
l
t) ≥ E
BRf (σlt)σ
l
t µt[a1:t−1]
{
Rlt(Xt, At)+
V lt+1(F (µt[a1:t−1], γ
l
t, B¯R
f
t (pit, γ
l
t), At), X
l
t+1)
∣∣a1:t−1, xl1:t} (96)
where γlt satisfies ∀xt+1 (such a γ
l
t exists from Lemma 9),
γlt(a
l
t|x
l
t) = σ
l
t(a
l
t|a1:t−1, x
l
1:t) (97)
F (µt[a1:t−1], γ
l
t, B¯R
f
t (pit, γ
l
t), at)(xt+1) = P
BRf (σ˜l1:t−1σ
l
tσ˜
l
t+1:T )σ˜
l
1:t−1σ
l
tσ˜t+1:T (xt+1|a1:t) (98)
The result below shows that the value function from the backwards recursive algorithm is
higher than any reward-to-go.
Lemma 14: For any t ∈ T , hlt and σ
l,
V
l,T
t (µt[h
c
t ], x
l
t) ≥W
l,σl,T
t (h
l
t). (99)
Proof 2: We use backward induction for this. At time T , using the maximization property
from (9) (modified with terminal reward Gl),
V
l,T
T (µT [h
c
T ], x
l
T ) (100a)
:= Eγ˜
l,T
T
(·|xl
T
),γ˜f,T
T
,µT [h
c
T
]
[
Rl(XT , AT ) + δG
l
(
F (µ
T
[hcT ], γ˜
T
T , AT ), X
l
T+1
)
| µ
T
[hcT ], x
l
T
]
(100b)
≥ Eγ
l,T
T
(·|xlT ),BR
f
T
(γl,T
T
),µT [h
c
T ]
[
Rl(XT , AT )
+ δGl
(
F (µ
T
[hcT ], γ
l,T
T BR
f
t (γ
l,T
T ), AT ), X
l
T+1
)
| µ
T
[hcT ], x
l
T
]
(100c)
= W l,σ
l,T
T (h
l
T ) (100d)
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Here the second inequality follows from (9) and (12) and the final equality is by definition
in (95). Let γlt satisfies ∀xt+1 (such a γ
l
t exists from Lemma 9),
γlt(a
l
t|x
l
t) = σ
l
t(a
l
t|a1:t−1, x
l
1:t) (101)
F (µt[a1:t−1], γ
l
t, B¯R
f
t (pit, γ
l
t), at)(xt+1) = P
BRf (σ˜l1:t−1σ
l
tσ˜
l
t+1:T )σ˜
l
1:t−1σ
l
tσ˜t+1:T (xt+1|a1:t) (102)
Assume that the result holds for all n ∈ {t+ 1, . . . , T}, then at time t we have
V
l,T
t (µt[h
c
t ], x
l
t) (103a)
≥ EBR
f (σlt)σ
l
t µt[a1:t−1]
{
Rlt(Xt, At)+
V lt+1(F (µt[a1:t−1], γ
l
t, B¯R
f
t (pit, γ
l
t), At), X
l
t+1)
∣∣a1:t−1, xl1:t} (103b)
≥ Eσ
l
t,BR
f (µt[hct ],σ
l
t),µt[h
c
t ]
[
Rl(Xt, At)
+ δEσ
l
t+1:T ,BR
f (µt+1[hct ,At]σ
l
t+1:T ),F (µt[a1:t−1],γ
l
t,B¯R
f
t (pit,γ
l
t),At)
[ T∑
n=t+1
δn−(t+1)Rl(Xn, An) + δ
T−tGl(ΠT+1, X
l
T+1) | h
l
t, At, X
l
t+1
]
| hlt
]
(103c)
= Eσ
l
t:T ,BR
f (µt[hct ],σ
l
t:T ),µt[h
c
t ]
[ T∑
n=t
δn−tRl(Xn, An) + δ
T+1−tGl(ΠT+1, X
l
T+1) | h
l
t
]
(103d)
= W l,σ
l,T
t (h
l
t) (103e)
Here the first inequality follows from Lemma 13, the second inequality from the induction
hypothesis and the fourth equality by definition (95).
APPENDIX J
The following result highlights the similarities between the fixed-point equation in infinite
horizon and the backwards recursion in the finite horizon.
Lemma 15: Consider the finite horizon game with for i = l, f , Gi ≡ V i. Then V i,Tt = V
i,
t ∈ {1, . . . , T} satisfies the backwards recursive construction stated above (adapted from (9) and
(12)).
Proof 3: Use backward induction for this. Consider the finite horizon algorithm at time t = T ,
noting that V i,TT+1 ≡ G
i ≡ V i,
BRlT (pi, γ
l) =
{
γ˜lT : γ˜
l
T ∈ arg max
γl
T
(·|xl
T
)
E
γl(·|xlT )γ
l
T , pi
{
RlT (X,A) + δV
l(F (piT , γ
l
T γ˜
l
T , AT ), X
l′
T )
∣∣piT , xlT}} , (104a)
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where expectation in (9) is with respect to random variables (X lT , AT , X
l′
T ) through the measure
pilT (x
l
T )γ
l
T (a
l
T |x
l
T )γ
l
T (a
l
T |x
l
T )Q(x
l′
T |x
l
T , aT ) and F is defined in (2).
Then let (γ˜lT , γ˜
l
T , V
l
T , V
l
T ) be a solution of the following fixed-point equation,
γ˜lT ∈ BR
l
T (piT , γ˜
l
T ) (104b)
and
γ˜lT ∈ argmax
γl
T
E
B¯R
l
T (piT γ
l
T )γ
l
T , piT
{
RlT (X,A) + δV
l(F (piT , γ
l
T B¯R
l
T (piTγ
l
T ), AT ), X
l′
T )|piT , x
l
T
}
(104c)
where the above expectation is defined with respect to random variables (XT , AT , X ′T ) through
the measure piT (x)γˆlT (a
l
T )γ
l
T (a
l
T )Q(x
′
T |xT−1, aT ), and γˆT ∈ B¯R
l
T (piTγ
l
T ). And ∀x
l
T ∈ X
l,
V
l,T
T (piT , x
l
T ) = E
γ˜l
T
(·|xT )γ˜lT , piT
{
RlT (x,A) + δV
l(F (piT , γ˜T , AT ), X
l′
T )
∣∣xlT} (104d)
V
l,T
T (piT , x
l
T ) = E
γ˜lT γ˜
l
T , piT
{
RlT (X,A) + δV
l(F (piT , γ˜T , AT ), X
l′
T )
∣∣xlT} . (104e)
Comparing the above set of equations with (19), we can see that the pair (V, γ˜) arising out
of (19) satisfies the above. Now assume that V l,Tn ≡ V
l for all n ∈ {t + 1, . . . , T}. At time
t, in the finite horizon construction from (104), (12), substituting V l in place of V l,Tt+1 from the
induction hypothesis, we get the same set of equations as (104). Thus V l,Tt ≡ V
l satisfies it.
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